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Abstract
Background: Financial protection against the cost of unforeseen ill health has become a global concern as
expressed in the 2005 World Health Assembly resolution (WHA58.33), which urges its member states to “plan the
transition to universal coverage of their citizens”. An important element of financial risk protection is to distribute
health care financing fairly in relation to ability to pay. The distribution of health care financing burden across
socio-economic groups has been estimated for European countries, the USA and Asia. Until recently there was no
such analysis in Africa and this paper seeks to contribute to filling this gap. It presents the first comprehensive
analysis of the distribution of health care financing in relation to ability to pay in Ghana.
Methods: Secondary data from the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) 2005/2006 were used. This was
triangulated with data from the Ministry of Finance and other relevant sources, and further complemented with
primary household data collected in six districts. We implored standard methodologies (including Kakwani index
and test for dominance) for assessing progressivity in health care financing in this paper.
Results: Ghana’s health care financing system is generally progressive. The progressivity of health financing is
driven largely by the overall progressivity of taxes, which account for close to 50% of health care funding. The
national health insurance (NHI) levy (part of VAT) is mildly progressive and formal sector NHI payroll deductions are
also progressive. However, informal sector NHI contributions were found to be regressive. Out-of-pocket payments,
which account for 45% of funding, are regressive form of health payment to households.
Conclusion: For Ghana to attain adequate financial risk protection and ultimately achieve universal coverage, it
needs to extend pre-payment cover to all in the informal sector, possibly through funding their contributions
entirely from tax, and address other issues affecting the expansion of the National Health Insurance. Furthermore,
the pre-payment funding pool for health care needs to grow so budgetary allocation to the health sector can be
enhanced.
Background
Health care financing strategies have recently been given
greater priority in international health policy debates
and research [1]. A consensus is emerging on the need
for developing countries to move towards universal cov-
erage through pre-payment financing mechanisms, given
that user fees and other direct payments have had and
continue to have negative effects, particularly on poor
individuals and households [2,3]. User fees and direct
payments disproportionately affect the poor. Unfortu-
nately exemptions that were introduced to try to cush-
ion the effects of user fees have failed to protect the
poor from catastrophic health care costs to the point
that 84% of those eligible for exemptions in Ghana
never got them [4]. Evidence also shows that simply
removing user fees, as some advocate, is not a sustain-
able solution to health care financing. It has to be sup-
ported by a simultaneous increase in funding through
pre-payment mechanisms [5]. There is therefore a grow-
ing need for developing countries, particularly in Africa,
to ensure fair financing in their health systems, and pro-
vide universal coverage with financial protection for
their populations if they are to achieve the health-
r e l a t e dM D Gg o a l sb y2 0 1 5( w h i c hi sl e s st h a nf i v e
years away). WHO has recognized this need and in its
World Health Assembly resolution WHA58.33 called on
all member states to “plan the transition to universal
coverage of their citizens” [6]. Identifying a combination
of health care financing mechanisms that would provide
the needed access to health care services for all citizens
* Correspondence: akazjames@yahoo.com
1Navrongo Health Research Centre, Ghana Health Service, P. O. Box 114,
Navrongo, Ghana
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Akazili et al. International Journal for Equity in Health 2011, 10:26
http://www.equityhealthj.com/content/10/1/26
© 2011 Akazili et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.is best informed by understanding how the burden of
health care financing currently falls on different seg-
ments of the population.
Although there is a commitment to pursuing a univer-
sal health system in Ghana, no assessment of equity in
health care financing has been undertaken. To improve
equity in health care financing and promote the goal of
achieving universal coverage, there is a need to measure
the degree of progressivity of existing health care finan-
cing mechanisms to be able to establish the relative
funding burden on the poor compared with the rich.
This will allow us to identify which health care financing
strategies are regressive (i.e. place a greater burden on
the poor) and which are progressive (i.e. the rich contri-
bute a higher proportion of their income than the poor).
It will therefore provide insights into which financing
mechanisms best provide financial protection and pro-
mote universal coverage.
The paper thus seeks to investigate the extent to
which paying for health care relates to people’s ability to
pay and to investigate the relative progressivity of each
of the financing mechanisms. The paper also assesses
the overall progressivity in Ghana’s health financing sys-
tem. The application of relevant tools for measuring the
equity of financing mechanisms, particularly for asses-
sing the progressivity of financing mechanisms, has
remained focused primarily on the health care systems
of developed countries and, more recently, some Asian
countries [7,8]. There has been only very limited appli-
cation in developing countries and almost none in sub-
Saharan Africa [9,10]. This is despite the apparent
importance of health care financing equity as a central
policy goal in many health systems in developing coun-
tries. With the exception of Tanzania and South Africa,
no such research has been carried out in Africa and so
the study not only serves as the first comprehensive
assessment of the relative progressivity of the various
health financing mechanisms in Ghana but has broader
relevance to other African countries.
Data and Methods
The secondary data used for the financing incidence cal-
culations were the latest Ghana Living Standards Survey
(GLSS) of 2005/2006 collected by the Ghana Statistical
Service, a national body responsible for conducting all
demographic, health and living standards surveys. This
is the fifth time this survey has been conducted, hence
its name of GLSS 5. The sample size for GLSS 5 was
8,687 households (see Table 1 for details). Data collected
by a GLSS relates to all aspects of household decision-
making and well-being. The nationally representative
data contain information on household consumption of
both durable and non-durable items. Data on the con-
sumption of durable items were collected for the
previous 12 months whilst those for non-durable or fre-
quently purchased items were collected weekly for ten
weeks using a weekly diary.
To complement the GLSS data, a primary household
survey
1 was conducted in a sample of six districts focus-
ing on contributions to the NHI and direct health care
payments. The SHIELD survey collected data on house-
hold expenditure on health care and household socio-
economic status (SES) among other variables. The
SHIELD household survey was weighted to be more
representative of the national population, based on the
proportion of rural and urban population as well as the
insured and uninsured population in the three broad
ecological zones of the country.
Analysis of financing incidence requires two key vari-
ables, the ability to pay or socio-economic status and
the amount paid towards health care through various
payment mechanisms. Each of them is examined in rela-
tion to how they were analyzed in this study.
The ability to pay or socio-economic status (SES) variable
The study related health care payments to SES within
households to determine the incidence of health care
payments (i.e. health care payments as a percentage of
household resources). The key issue is how best to mea-
sure SES or living standards. The approaches available
for measuring SES that are applicable to the evaluation
of the incidence of health care payments are household
income and household consumption expenditure.
According to the literature, the most ‘relevant’ measure
of SES must depend largely on the availability of the
required data. As noted in a study in Nepal, there is no
perfect measure of SES [11]. Income and consumption
expenditure measures have each been used in different
studies [8]. Reported income is often seen as a good mea-
sure of SES. The use of income as a measure of socio-
economic status for example, allows one to examine
income elasticity in health care payments. Income also
measures the degree of household control over resources
(which they could use if they so wish) [12].
Table 1 Data source
Secondary Primary
Name of Survey GLSS SHIELD
survey
Year of Survey 2005/2006 2008
Number of households 8,687 2,986
Number of individuals 36,488 14050
Sample as a % of total pop of
Ghana
0.17 0.007
Weighted to national
population
Yes Yes
Organisation Ghana Statistical
Services
Own field
work
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lack of an organized labour market particularly in sub-
Saharan Africa and income variability over time does
not allow it to be a good estimate of SES especially in
developing countries like Ghana. Income could also be
underestimated in developing countries with a large
informal sector population and subsistence agriculture
activities. Also for fear of taxes or other related issues,
people tend to under report their income. Due to the
drawbacks with income measurement, household con-
sumption expenditure is often preferred in this kind of
analysis. It is important to note that consumption
expenditure also has its drawbacks. For instance house-
holds tend to under-declare what they spend on certain
additive goods (e.g. alcohol, cigarettes) or illicit items (e.
g. drugs, prostitution). Despite the drawbacks, consump-
tion expenditure is a better measure than income parti-
cularly in developing countries with a large informal
sector. In the first place, consumption expenditure
smoothes out income irregularities and so reflects long-
term average well-being. Secondly, consumption expen-
diture tends to be less understated than income because
it is easier to provide expenditure information than
income [13].
The construction of the socio-economic measure in
this study is based on household’s reported expenditure
and consumption of food, housing and other non-food
items. The measure also takes into consideration con-
sumption from sources other than purchases from the
market (e.g. subsistence agriculture products). The unit
of analysis in the comprehensive health care financing
incidence analysis and cross sectional case studies is the
household. Households were divided into five quintiles
for aspects of the analysis.
Financing mechanisms-calculations
Tax (direct and indirect) incidence analysis
An analysis of tax incidence is required in this study
because the Ghanaian health care system, as in many
other developing countries, is significantly financed by
direct and indirect tax revenue.
Certain assumptions
2 have to be made about the tax-
shifting element. These shifting assumptions facilitate
the allocation of the burden of each tax payment to dif-
ferent income groups [14]. In this study, we assume that
the incidence of direct tax (mainly personal income tax
in Ghana) falls on the legal tax payer and indirect taxes
(import, fuel levy, VAT) fall on the consumer. The only
tax that has little agreement in the literature about its
incidence assumption is corporate tax (CT) and due to
the lack of consensus as to how corporate tax incidence
should be calculated, a number of approaches have been
put forward. Different authors have assumed the burden
or incidence of corporate tax differently [13,14]. The key
elements of the debate regarding this tax have been
whether increases in corporate tax will result in lower
wages, lower retail earnings or higher prices? Some wri-
ters [13-15] assume an equal share (50%) of the burden
for consumers and shareholders (mainly foreign owned
in Ghana) and this is applied in this study. The assump-
tion of an equal share (50%) of the burden of corporate
tax to consumers and shareholders is applied here
because of the lack of consensus in the literature as to
who ultimately bears the burden of corporate tax. The
taxes identified and measured in this study included
direct taxes (income tax and corporate tax), indirect
taxes (VAT, National Healt hI n s u r a n c eL e v y( N H I L ) ,
fuel levy, import duty). These taxes make up over 95%
of the total tax revenue collected in Ghana. In calculat-
ing the incidence of tax payments, each tax payment per
household was estimated from relevant sections of the
GLSS and triangulated with actual revenue from this tax
as reported by the tax collector or Ministry of Finance.
Non-tax health care financing incidence analysis
Apart from tax, health care in Ghana is also financed by
health insurance contributions made up of premiums
(through District Health Insurance Schemes-DHIS)
from the informal sector and payroll deductions
3 (by
Social Security and National Insurance Trust-SSNIT) to
the National health insurance scheme as well as out-of-
pocket (OOP) payments. Before allocating the above
health care payments to income groups by quintiles of
households, it is important to state the incidence
assumption as to who bears the burden of each of the
health care payments. The incidence of SSNIT contribu-
tions for instance falls on formal sector workers and
that of the DHIS contributions fall on those who are in
the informal sector who are insured. OOP payments are
assumed to directly affect the consumer of the service.
Most previous estimates of the incidence of OOP pay-
ments in developing countries have relied on data from
small-scale health surveys that are not nationally repre-
sentative and often restricted to rural areas [16,17]. We
analysed data from the GLSS which has comprehensive
information on health care and household consumption
expenditure and which allow us to estimate the magni-
tude of the incidence of OOP payments in Ghana.
With regard to the incidence of the national health
insurance (NHI) contributions, comprehensive data on
health insurance contributions including premium and
registration payments largely by the informal sector was
collected through the SHIELD household survey in six
districts in 2008. As the NHI was only introduced in
2004, the GLSS (conducted in 2005) did not capture
much information on these payments, hence the need
for the SHIELD survey. The premium contributions
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insurance schemes is graduated by law (Act 650). It
ranges from ¢72,000 to ¢480,000 (US$8.00 to US$53.00)
[18,19]. The graduation was designed in such a way that
the poor should pay the lowest rate and the higher rates
should be paid by the rich. However, in reality it appears
that the premium payment generally is flat, due to the
difficulty of assessing an informal sector household’s
ability-to-pay, which makes it all the more important to
document the distribution of the burden of this payment
mechanism across the population as a whole. The GLSS
was used to predict the consumption expenditure vari-
able in the SHIELD data. The assumption was made
that the variable on frequent spending in the SHIELD
data set was analogous to the frequent spending vari-
ables in the GLSS data. The expenditures on frequently
purchased items, age of the head of the household and
location (rural/urban and region) of the household
were identified and used to predict the total consump-
tion expenditure through a log regression model. The
correlation of the prediction was about 80%. The pre-
diction was based on the GLSS and coefficients
obtained from this regression were used to predict the
consumption expenditure in the SHIELD survey [20].
Table 2 provides a summary of each type of financing
mechanism and the quantification technique. It should
be noted that the 4.3% that constitute other taxes in
Table 2 was allocated to the identified taxes according
to their percentage share of the total taxes in the ana-
lysis. This technique was used in a similar study in
South Africa [10].
The Kakwani index for measuring progressivity of health
care financing
In addition to estimating contributions to each financing
mechanism as a percentage of consumption expenditure
in each quintile, it was necessary to calculate the inci-
dence of financing using the Lorenz and concentration
curves to establish whether a health care financing
mechanism is progressive, regressive or proportional
relative to ability to pay (ATP) or SES. The Lorenz
curve is a graphical representation of the cumulative
distribution function of the empirical probability distri-
bution of wealth or ATP or SES. The concentration
curve plots the cumulative distribution of health care
payments, while the concentration index is twice the
area between the concentration curve and line of equal-
ity (the 45º line running from the bottom-left corner to
the top-right). To enable the illustration of the degree of
relative progressivity of each health care payment
mechanism and the overall health financing incidence,
we use the Kakwani index. Other methods like the Suits
index could be used but the Kakwani index is more
popular and widely used in this type of analysis [8,21].
The Kakwani index is defined as twice the area between
the Lorenz curve for gross consumption expenditure
(ATP or SES) and the concentration curve for health
care payments [9,22]. Kakwani index was computed as
the difference between the concentration coefficients of
health care payments and the Gini coefficients of
income (i.e. expenditure). The value of the Kakwani
index ranges from -2 to 1 [22]. A positive Kakwani
index indicates the health care financing system is pro-
gressive, so that the Lorenz curve lies above the concen-
tration curve, and vice versa if it is regressive. A
Kakwani index of zero indicates proportionality of
health care payments and thus the Lorenz and concen-
tration payments curves would coincide. According to
Wagstaff and others, when the concentration curve for
health care payments lies completely outside the Lorenz
curve of ATP or SES (which in this case is based on
household consumption expenditure), the health care
payment is progressive. The opposite is true if it is
regressive. Proportionality is attained when the two
curves coincide [21]. Test of dominance, using the stan-
dard errors and point estimators of the concentration
and Lorenz curves were performed to assess whether the
difference between the concentration and the Lorenz
curve or the 45 degree line is statistically significant [23].
Results
General taxes
Direct taxes
Direct taxes are those paid directly to the revenue
authorities. The main direct taxes in Ghana are Personal
Income Tax (PIT) and Corporate Tax (CT). The con-
centration curve for PIT and CT (using the assumption
that 50% of CT is distributed across household accord-
ing to their reported consumption expenditure on man-
ufactured goods and 50% across shareholders based on
receipts of dividends) were constructed as well as the
Lorenz curve for household consumption expenditure.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the concentration curves of
P I Ta n dC Tl i eo u t s i d et h eL o r e n zc u r v e .I no t h e r
words the Lorenz curve dominates the concentration
curves of PIT and CT payments indicating that they are
progressive. The Kakwani index of PIT and CT was cal-
culated at 0.256 and 0.099 respectively (see Table 3) and
this confirms the progressivity of PIT and CT.
Indirect taxes
The main indirect taxes in Ghana in 2005/2006 were
VAT (including the national health insurance levy
(NHIL) which is a component of VAT), fuel levy and
import duty. Figure 2 depicts the results of the indirect
taxes and as can be seen, the concentration curve of
VAT lies outside of the Lorenz curve of consumption
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confirming progressivity. With regard to the fuel levy
(composed of levies from petrol, diesel, engine oil, kero-
sene and other lubricants), the concentration curve
dominates the Lorenz curve, suggesting that the fuel
levy is regressive (see Figure 2). The Kakwani index for
the fuel levy was -0.041 (see Table 3) and this means
that the fuel levy in Ghana is regressive. In terms of
import duty, the concentration curve is completely
dominated by the Lorenz curve. To obtain the magni-
tude of the progressivity of import duty, the Kakwani
index was calculated and has a value of 0.129.
Table 2 Financing incidence analysis estimation techniques
Component Share in Total
Health care
financing
Source of
Data
Rates
a Computation technique
Taxes 47%
Personal
Income Tax
c
5.2% GLSS, 2005/
2006
5%-20% depending on income
level.
Apply the appropriate tax rate and tax thresholds on the
gross taxable income (salaries and wages received, income
from business or professional practice/activities, part of
dividends and interest received and/or accrued on deposits)
of working age individuals within each household within the
taxable range
Corporate
Income Tax
7.1% GLSS, 2005/
2006
Rate is 28% and this is paid
quarterly in the case of large
companies.
Apportioning the total corporate tax receipts based on the
Ministry of Finance data to households based on the tax
shifting assumptions. Assumption of tax shifting includes
certain percentage borne by shareholders (the GLSS collected
information on those who receive dividends) and the rest by
households through consumption. The tax shifting
assumption was equal (50:50) tax burden shared between
consumers and shareholders/capital owners
Value Added
Tax (VAT)
11.3% GLSS, 2005/
2006
15% on standard rate goods and
services
The VAT rate is applied to expenditure of goods and services
that are standard rated excluding the zero-rated and
exempted goods (since 2.5% is specially earmarked fund for
education and 2.5% for health services, 10% was considered
in the calculations)
National
Health
Insurance
Levy
2.4% GLSS, 2005/
2006
2.5% on standard rated goods and
services
The same distribution across households as VAT but at 2.5%.
NHIL rate is applied to expenditure of goods and services
that are standard rated excluding the zero-rated and
exempted goods (the same goods and services as VAT).
Import Duty 8.0% GLSS, 2005/
2006
Varied depending on item Comprehensive list of items subject ot import duty and
amount received in duty for each item was obtained from
Custom Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) and this
amounts were allocated to households based on reported
consumption of these imported items from GLSS
Fuel Levy 8.5% GLSS, 2005/
2006
¢716.72/litre for petrol
¢429.96/litre for Diesel
¢353.88/litre for kerosene
Since fuel is consumed by households (for both personal and
public transport) as well as corporate users, estimation
involved a process of generating the component attributable
to public transport users, users of private transport and those
attributable to users in businesses
Other 4.3% GLSS, 2005/
2006
Includes taxes on cigarette, drinks,
stamps, airport departures, and
unidentified levies.
Not calculated (small share of total revenue)
Insurance 5%
National
Health
Insurance
Scheme
5% SHIELD
household
survey 2008
b
Total national health insurance contributions is made up of
premium contributions of the informal sector and payroll
deduction of formal sector workers
Out-of-
pocket
payment
48%
OOP
payments
48% GLSS, 2005/
2006
Comprehensive household expenditure on medicines,
consultations, preventive and curative treatments, procedures
excluding transportation were summed up
aThis applies to the taxes and are based on the 2005/2006 assessment year: NB: GLSS-Ghana Living Standard Survey.
bThis was our own survey that was collected to complement the GLSS data and to answer key questions on the NHIS.
cRebates is not a common practice in Ghana *Inter-bank exchange rate = ¢9,072.12 to US$1.00 in 2005.
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Pooling all the components of general tax together
(direct and indirect), but excluding the NHIL and edu-
cation earmarked tax, the incidence of tax overall was
calculated. Figure 3 shows that overall taxation is pro-
gressive. Figure 3 shows the incidence of that portion of
general taxes that goes to health as well as the NHIL. It
is to be noted that government allocated 15% of tax rev-
enue to the health sector in 2005/2006. The only tax to
which the 15% figure was not applied was the NHIL as
this is an earmarked tax that goes in total to the health
sector. The results shows that tax overall is progressive
(Kakwani index = 0.130).
The concentration curves for direct, indirect (exclud-
ing NHIL and dedicated education tax) and overall taxes
are compared with the Lorenz curve of consumption
expenditure (see Figure 4). Direct tax is the most pro-
gressive as is revealed by the magnitude of the domi-
nance of the Lorenz curve over the concentration curve.
The concentration curve for direct tax lies well outside
the Lorenz curve (Figure 4).
Non-tax health care payments
Apart from allocations from tax revenue, the Ghanaian
health system is financed by direct out-of-pocket (OOP)
payments (accounting for nearly half of all health care
expenditure) and health insurance (composing of pre-
miums and payroll deductions). The concentration
curves for OOP and health insurance were constructed
and as can be observed in Figure 5, OOP payments are
a regressive means of funding health care in Ghana.
This is because the concentration curve of OOP pay-
ments dominates the Lorenz curve throughout the dis-
tribution except for the last section (top right corner)
where the two curves (Lorenz and concentration) appear
to coincide (see Figure 5). The regressivity of OOP pay-
ments is confirmed by the negative value for the Kak-
wani index (-0.070). In contrast, contributions to the
NHI are progressive with the burden of these payments
rests more on the rich than the poor. The concentration
curve of total NHI contributions confirms the progres-
sivity of the total NHI contributions (Figure 5). The
concentration curve lies completely outside the Lorenz
curve. Further confirmation of the progressivity of the
total NHI contribution is shown in Table 3, where the
Kakwani index is positive (0.144). It is important to
mention that NHI contribution from the formal sector
is progressive (Kakwani index = 0.256) whilst the infor-
mal NHI contributions (premiums) are regressive (Kak-
wani index = -0.307).
Total health care financing incidence
Table 3 combines all sources of health care payment
except NHI contributions in Ghana (general tax, NHIL
and out-of-pocket payments) and measures their total
payments as a proportion of consumption expenditure.
The table also provides summary statistics of the Gini
coefficient of the consumption expenditure and the con-
centration index of health care payments from which
the Kakwani indices are calculated.
Table 3 shows that health care financing is generally
progressive (i.e. the combined effect of general tax,
NHIL and out-of-pocket payments from GLSS 2005/
2006 data and the NHI contributions from SHIELD
2008 data). It should be noted again that only a portion
of total government tax resources (i.e. 15% in 2005/
2006) was allocated to the health sector and this is fac-
tored into the calculation of the general tax component.
Personal income tax
Corporate tax
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
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Lorenz (y) Personal income tax
Corporate tax 45 degree line
 
Figure 1 Concentration curves of PIT and CT payments and Lorenz curve of household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006.
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Page 6 of 13Table 3 Cumulative shares of health payments by consumption expenditure quintile, Ghana (GLSS 2005/2006 & SHIELD 2008)
Per capita Household (HH)
Expenditure Quintile
Per capita HH
Expend
GLSS 2005/2006 Data SHIELD data
2008
Direct taxes (A) Indirect taxes (B) (C) Out-of-
pocket Payment
Total financing of
A, B and C
Personal
Inc tax
Corp Inc
tax∞
Direct
tax
VAT± Import
duty
Fuel
levy
Kerosene
levy
Indirect
tax
NHI
contributions
Poorest 20% (Standard error) 5.53%
(0.096)
1.25%*
(0.208)
3.38%*
(0.807)
1.99%*
(0.271)
3.26%*
(0.931)
4.02%*
(0.496)
6.43%*
(0.197)
16.76%*
(0.376)
4.07%*
(0.570)
6.92%
(1.810)
4.33%
(-0.88)
2.91%*
(0.371)
Poorest 40% (Standard error) 15.64%
(0.2371)
6.36%*
(1.616)
10.70%*
(2.469)
7.85%*
(1.294)
8.91%*
(1.930)
11.48%*
(1.411)
17.97%*
(0.425)
37.82%*
(0.594)
11.34%*
(1.330)
19.36%
(2.758)
12.85%
(-1.79)
10.06%*
(0.994)
Poorest 60% (Standard error) 30.38%
(0.4288)
13.01%*
(1.865)
23.58%
(4.962)
16.66%*
(1.910)
19.42%*
(4.399)
22.04%*
(2.691)
33.88%*
(0.676)
60.49%*
(0.685)
22.85%*
(2.758)
37.72%
(4.647)
25.74%
(-3.11)
19.31%*
(1.344)
Poorest 80% (Standard error) 51.64%
(0.6813)
27.84%*
(2.651)
44.05%
(8.462)
33.43%*
(3.131)
53.54%
(9.624)
39.78%*
(4.851)
54.60%*
(0.960)
81.80%*
(0.630)
49.47%
(5.574)
57.98%
(6.395)
46.96%
(-5.03)
38.42%*
(2.134)
Test of Dominance-Against 45%
line
- - ------ -- - -
-Against Lorenz C - - - + + - - -
Concentration index/Gini coeff 0.424 0.680 0.522 0.625 0.473 0.552 0.383 0.016 0.481 0.354 0.487 0.567
(Robust SE) (0.019) (0.040) (0.087) (0.037) (0.074) (0.038) (0.014) (0.013) (0.041) (0.059) (0.046) (0.031)
(p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kakwani index 0.256 0.098 0.202 0.049 0.129 -0.041 -0.408 0.057 -0.070 0.064 0.143
(Robust SE) (0.112) (0.207) (0.101) (0.144) (0.082) (0.036) (0.034) (0.081) (0.093) (0.092) (0.074)
(P-value) (0.022) (0.632) (0.046) (0.733) (0.115) (0.261) (0.000) (0.477) (0.463) (0.329) (0.051)
Source: Author.
Note: For shares: Bold indicates significant difference from population share (5%).
* indicates significant difference from expenditure share (5%).
(Standard errors for concentration and Kakwani indexes are robust to heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation).
∞ Assumption is that corporate tax is distributed equally (50/50) across households (based on reported consumption of manufactured goods) and shareholders (based on receipt of dividends) ** NHIL: National
Health insurance levy (2.5% of social security of formal workers).
# Dominance test (- indicates the 45% degree line/Lorenz curve dominates the concentration curve: + indicates concentration curve dominates 45%-degreeline/Lorenz curve. Blank indicates non dominance. ± NHIL
has same results as that of VAT.
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3The Kakwani index of 0.064 for the combined general
tax, NHIL and out-of-payment and 0.143 for the NHI
contributions shows that health care financing is Ghana
is generally progressive. It can be seen from Table 4
that the poor (Quintile 1 and 2) are nevertheless making
substantial contributions of their meagre income to
health care, particularly through OOP payments.
Discussion
African countries face many challenges in health care
financing, not least being the inadequacy of funding and
the high direct out-of-pocket payments for health care.
In this context, there is a critical need for a comprehen-
sive analysis of the progressivity of health care financing
to inform debate on alternative health care financing
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2006.
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Page 8 of 13approaches. This is especially the case for Ghana at a
time when the country is still in the process of restruc-
turing its health care financing in the wake of the intro-
duction of a national health insurance system. The
findings show that direct taxes, which comprise personal
income tax and corporate tax, are progressive with posi-
tive Kakwani indices. The progressivity of direct tax is
consistent with findings elsewhere (see Table 5).
Indeed in almost all countries examined to date, per-
sonal income tax is progressive in essence because these
taxes are explicitly structured to be progressive. Corpo-
rate tax in Ghana was found to be progressive, but has a
lower Kakwani index than personal income tax. Taken
together, this means of course that direct taxes are pro-
gressive which is consistent with the results of other
published empirical studies [8,24,25].
0
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Lorenz (y) Total tax
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Figure 4 Concentration curves of Total tax payments and Lorenz curve of household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006.
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Figure 5 Concentration curves of OOP and NHI payments and Lorenz curve of household expenditure, Ghana: 2005/2006.
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Page 9 of 13In contrast, the international evidence (see Table 5) on
indirect taxes suggests that these tend to be regressive in
some countries but progressive in others. They have
been found to be regressive in Sweden, Denmark, Japan,
Sri Lanka and South Africa [8,10,26] but progressive in
many low- and middle-income countries in Asia (e.g.
Bangladesh, Thailand and China) [8]. In Ghana, indirect
taxes analyzed in this study include import duty, fuel
levy, VAT and the National Health Insurance Levy
(NHIL). With the exception of the fuel levy, the other
elements of indirect taxes were found to be progressive
(see Table 3). Fuel is regressive because of the influence
of kerosene taxes, which is largely consumed by the
poor. VAT is progressive because of the wide range of
exemptions on agricultural goods and other goods lar-
gely consumed by the poor and that many goods pur-
chased in rural markets escape the VAT ‘net’.T h e
progressivity of VAT is important in Ghanaian health
care financing since the NHIL, which is the main source
of the NHIS is a component of VAT. However the Kak-
wani index is less than 0.10. It is necessary to sound a
warning here that if, as is likely, the economy becomes
more formalized and more people end up paying VAT,
VAT and the NHIL might well move to being
Table 4 Distribution of total health financing as a proportion of household consumption expenditure by quintile in
Ghana
Financing sources
Socio-economic status General tax
a NHIL
a NHI contributions
b OOP payments
a
Quintile 1 (poorest) 1.50% 0.55% 0.08% 2.87%
Quintile 2 1.62% 0.59% 0.09% 2.83%
Quintile 3 1.84% 0.64% 0.09% 2.61%
Quintile 4 2.31% 0.73% 0.11% 2.18%
Quintile 5 (richest) 3.17% 0.98% 0.13% 2.76%
aGLSS 2005/2006 data
bSHIELD 2008 data.
Table 5 Cross-country comparison of progressivity indices (distributional incidence of health care financing)
Country Year Financing mechanisms Total financing
Direct tax Indirect tax NHI/SHI contributions OOP or direct payments
Africa
Ghana 2005/2006 0.202 0.057 0.144 -0.068 0.071
South Africa 2005/2006 - - - -0.0259 0.065
Asian countries
Bangladesh 1999/2000 0.552 0.111 - 0.219 0.214
Thailand 2002 0.510 0.182 0.180 0.091 0.197
Phillippines 1999 0.381 0.002 0.205 0.139 0.163
Malaysia 1998/1999 0.395 -0.078 0.081 0.104 0.186
Taiwan 2000 0.244 0.040 -0.075 -0.079 -0.029
Sri-Lanka 1996/1997 0.569 -0.010 - 0.069 0.085
Indonesia 2001 0.196 0.074 0.306 0.176 0.173
China 2000 0.152 0.040 0.235 -0.017 0.040
Nepal 1995/1996 0.144 0.114 - 0.053 0.063
Japan 1998 0.100 -0.223 -0.042 -0.269 -0.069
OECD countries
Portugal 1980 0.279 0.079 0.277 -0.158 0.063
The Netherlands 1987 0.185 -0.009 -0.002 -0.059 -0.034
Spain 1980 0.170 0.023 -0.063 0.016 -0.023
Italy 1987 0.054 0.001 0.028 -0.004 0.022
USA 1981 0.162 -0.174 -0.035 -0.387 -0.145
UK 1985 0.131 -0.059 0.043 -0.190 0.032
Ireland 1987 0.250 -0.120 0.110 -0.070 0.034
Source: (Ataguba, McIntyre 2009 [1]; Wagstaff, van Doorslaer et al. 1999 [26]; O’Donnell, van Doorslaer et al. 2008 [8]); Authors own calculations for Ghana.
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Page 10 of 13proportional or even regressive. This possible change
needs to be acknowledged and there is a need for con-
tinual monitoring of the incidence of this financing
m e c h a n i s m( N H I L )s ot h a tG h a n ad o e sn o te n du p
using a regressive financing mechanism to fund the
NHI. Considering all the indirect taxes together, indirect
tax is progressive as demonstrated by a positive Kakwani
index. This is consistent with other low-income coun-
tries like Bangladesh, Malaysia, Thailand and Tanzania
[8,24,27].
The national health insurance contributions, which are
made up of formal sector payroll deductions and infor-
mal sector premium contributions, are progressive over-
all. This progressivity is largely a function of the payroll
deductions. However, the informal sector’sp r e m i u m
contributions, which are the basis for the expansion of
the NHI to universal coverage, were found to be very
regressive. Thus, within the informal sector, the poor
are bearing the brunt of the NHI contributions (relative
to their available household resources) compared to
their richer counterparts. This is because everybody in
the informal sector pays the same contribution, which
in turn is the result of the failure to implement the sys-
tem of graduated premiums and full exemptions for the
poorest that was part of the original design of the
national health insurance scheme (NHIS). This finding
means that policy makers, government and all stake-
holders of the NHIS must review the design of the
NHIS and its implementation, not just the financing per
se but also the other institutional arrangements such as
t h eg r a d u a t i o no fp r e m i u m sa n dt h ep o l i c yo nt h e
operation of exemptions, which are simply not func-
tional at present. The NHIS financing arrangements are
supposed to be pro-poor, but as the scheme operates
currently, they are not [28].
Apart from taxes and the NHI, the Ghana health care
system is largely funded by direct out-of-pocket (OOP)
payments. These accounted for 48% of total health care
financing in 2005/2006. This form of financing has been
found (with few exceptions) to be regressive (see Table
5). Indeed as is the case in Ghana, OOP payments have
been found elsewhere to be more regressive (or at best,
less progressive) than any other form of health care
financing [8,26]. Even in countries (such as Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Philippines and Korea) where OOP payments
are progressive [8], the reason for this is that poor
households simply cannot afford to pay for health care
and therefore do not access health services. In other
words, the seemingly ‘progressive’ OOP payments can
be simply attributed to the fact that the poorest of the
poor do not use health services when they are required
to pay at the point of service delivery.
On the whole, health care financing in Ghana was
found to be progressive. This finding is largely driven by
the progressivity of most forms of tax, which make up
close to 50% of total health financing. It remains the
case, however, as the paper has shown that some taxes
such as the fuel levy and out-of-pocket payments are
regressive thereby diminishing the level of overall pro-
gressivity in health care funding.
The results presented in the previous section thus
provide the answer to the key question “who pays for
health care in Ghana?” The brief answer is that it is lar-
gely the better-off who pay for health care financing;
however, the poor are also making substantial contribu-
tions relative to their household resources towards
health care financing in Ghana, as can be observed in
table 3 and 4.
Conclusion
Interest in the distribution of health care payments
across socio-economic groups arises in part due to its
potential redistributive effect, particularly in terms of
compulsory contributions towards health financing (e.g.
through tax and national health insurance). Progressive
financing takes proportionately more from the rich than
the poor and could leads to a more equal the post-tax
distribution of income. The paper assessed the incidence
of health care financing in Ghana employing concentra-
tion curves and Kakwani’s progressivity indices. This
analysis represents the first study in West Africa to
measure the progressivity of each of the health care
financing sources and of the whole health care financing
system in a comprehensive manner.
In terms of an assessment of the equity of health care
financing in Ghana, this study highlights the regressivity
of out-of-pocket payments. It was the recognition by
government of the heavy burden of these payments and
the barrier they create to health service access that
prompted the introduction of the national health insur-
ance in Ghana. However, the fact that OOP payments
still constitute almost half of total health care expendi-
ture and the extent of their regressivity highlights the
need for more concerted efforts to increase the share of
pre-payment financing mechanisms. Although, exemp-
tions and waivers were advocated and implemented to
reduce the burden of OOP payments, their effects have
largely been negative due to poor implementation (e.g.
lack of clarity in policy strategy) and insufficient funds
[2,4,29].
T h e r ea r ean u m b e ro fp o s i t i v em e s s a g e sf r o mt h i s
study in terms of the NHI. Firstly, the NHI levy, which
is part of VAT, is currently progressive, but this may
change in future and requires ongoing monitoring. Sec-
ond, the contributions by formal sector workers are also
progressive. However, the major concern in relation to
the NHI is that contributions made by the informal sec-
tor are highly regressive. These contributions constitute
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Page 11 of 13a very small share of total NHI revenue (about 5%) and
the government is currently considering instituting a
‘one-time payment’ for those in the informal sector [20],
which will effectively translate into tax funding of the
contributions for all outside the formal sector. The find-
ing of the regressivity of insurance contributions by the
informal sector is also relevant to other low- and mid-
dle-income countries which are pursuing health insur-
ance for the informal sector and/or are planning to
implement mandatory health insurance on a contribu-
tory basis for the entire population as part of a strategy
for moving to universal coverage.
For Ghana to attain adequate financial protection for
its citizens and ultimately achieve universal coverage, it
needs to extend pre-payment cover to all in the informal
sector, possibly through funding their contributions
entirely from tax and possibly increasing budgetary allo-
cation to the health sector. While this is not a simple
task, it is the road that must be travelled if Ghana is to
achieve its goal of universal coverage.
Endnotes
1 This survey is call “Strategies for Health Insurance for
Equity in Less Developed countries-SHIELD"(http://web.
uct.ac.za/depts/heu/SHIELD/about/about.htm)
2 Conventional tax incidence studies compute tax
incidence on the basis of annual data for income
sources and expenditure patterns and also on the basis
of several assumptions concerning how the different
taxes are shifted to households either because they are
consumers, producers or owners of factors of produc-
tion (land, labour, and capital). These assumptions are
known in the literature under different interchangeable
names: “shifting assumptions” or “incidence assump-
tions,” or “sources and uses side effects”.
3 2.5% of formal workers’ salaries go to the NHIF as
their premium contributions to the national health
insurance scheme (NHIS)
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